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Government Falsehoods, Democratic Harm, And
the Constitution
HELEN NORTON*
The government’s lies inflict injuries that differ in both degree and kind
from those caused by nongovernmental parties’ lies. In other words, the
government’s intentional and reckless falsehoods threaten distinct and
especially serious harms—both to individual targets and to the public more
broadly—precisely because of their governmental source. How, if at all, does
the Constitution address the government’s harmful falsehoods? Caroline Mala
Corbin investigates this important question in The Unconstitutionality of
Government Propaganda.1

THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS THAT INJURE IDENTIFIABLE
INDIVIDUALS IN PARTICULARIZED WAYS
At times, the government deploys falsehoods as weapons to punish its
enemies and critics or to coerce its targets’ waiver of their rights. Illustrations
include the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission’s defamatory lies—
alleging financial, sexual, and legal misconduct—to the employers, friends, and
neighbors of those who fought segregation in the 1950s and 1960s.2 And the
FBI’s false threats to African-American editor and journalist Charlotta Bass
during World War II that her newspaper would be shut down “if she continued
to equate the fight against Nazism with that for civil rights at home.”3 And, more
recently, New Orleans prosecutors’ fake subpoenas (delivered by police officers
to pressure crime victims and potential witnesses into coming forward) that
falsely stated “A fine and imprisonment may be imposed for failure to obey this
notice.”4
Courts have recognized that the Constitution can constrain the
government’s lies and other expressive choices that inflict these sorts of
individualized injuries. While recognizing that the First Amendment does not—
indeed, as a practical matter, could not—bar the government from expressing

* Professor and Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law.
1 Caroline Mala Corbin, Trump’s Lies: The Unconstitutionality of Government
Propaganda, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 815 (2020).
2 See ACLU v. Miss., 911 F.2d 1066, 1068–70 (5th Cir. 1990).
3 See AIMEE EDMONDSON, IN SULLIVAN’S SHADOW: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LIBEL
LAW DURING THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE 27–28 (2019).
4 See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 956 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 2020).
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its own views when doing the government’s business,5 the Supreme Court has
also clarified that
[A] government’s ability to express itself is [not] without restriction.
Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may
limit government speech. And the Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private
persons to convey the government’s speech.6

More specifically, courts have held that the government violates the Free
Speech Clause when its falsehoods cause nongovernmental third parties to fire
or otherwise retaliate against its critics, when its verbal “campaigns of
harassment and humiliation” are reasonably likely to deter its targets’ protected
speech, and when its threats of punishment silence its critics’ speech as
effectively as actual punishment.7
The Due Process Clause offers an additional check on governmental lies
that effectively deprive their targets of their liberties. Examples include law
enforcement officers’ lies to those in custody that coerce their targets’
involuntary waiver of constitutional rights, and governmental falsehoods that
deny their targets’ meaningful exercise of voting rights or unduly burden
women’s exercise of their reproductive rights.8

THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS THAT INFLICT DEMOCRATIC HARM
In contrast, some of the government’s falsehoods inflict collective harms
upon the general public. More specifically, the government’s intentional or
reckless falsehoods can frustrate democratic self-governance when they deny
the public the information it needs to hold the government accountable for its
performance. Think, for example, of the government’s lies told to stymie
political and legal accountability for its misconduct. Think too of governmental
efforts to undermine public confidence in truth-seeking institutions—like the
press, inspectors general, health professionals, and scientists more generally—
that may challenge the government’s preferred narrative. Examples here include
the government’s false attacks on its critics, opponents, and watchdogs,9 as well
as its falsehoods about a wide variety of facts that seek not only to persuade
5 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207–08
(2015) (“[W]hen government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says . . . . Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted
otherwise, government would not work.”).
6 Id. at 208.
7 See HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 156–82
(2019) (detailing these cases).
8 See id. at 135–46 (discussing these applications).
9 See id. at 156–63 and 176–82 (documenting examples); RonNell Andersen Jones &
Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301 (2017)
(documenting the Trump Administration’s attacks on the press).
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listeners that a particular false assertion is true but also to inculcate listeners’
doubt about the possibility of truth more generally. To be sure, U.S. government
speakers are not alone in exploiting these sorts of lies for partisan ends, as these
expressive strategies feature prominently in the playbook of authoritarian
regimes that spread “disinformation” for political and military ends.10
Professor Corbin rightly worries about the government’s falsehoods that
interfere with democratic functions and institutions. As she explains:
We are able to hold our government officials accountable because we can vote
them, or those who appointed them, out of office. In order for our consent-byvote to be genuine, we need to know what those entrusted to serve us have
done. By making it harder to unearth the truth and harder to see it and believe
it when it does see the light of day, government propaganda hampers this
fundamental democratic process.11

Additionally, she writes:
[T]he onslaught of government propaganda destabilizes truth itself, which not
only hinders the press’s ability to perform its watchdog function, but also
discourages people from even seeking the truth in the first place. Indeed, this
destabilization of truth, along with repetition, cognitive shortcuts, echo
chambers, and motivated reasoning, helps explain why government
propaganda succeeds. The end result is failure to hold government accountable.
Instead of an informed electorate giving or withholding its genuine consent at
the ballot box, an ill-informed electorate may be giving or withholding a
manipulated or falsified consent.12

The government’s falsehoods thus inflict democratic harm when they deny
the public the information necessary to hold the government accountable for its
misconduct, undermine citizens’ ability to make informed voting choices,
sabotage the policymaking process when participants cannot rely on others’
assertions, and foster public cynicism about (and disengagement from)
democratic self-governance.13
These falsehoods inflict democratic harm not only by frustrating the
people’s ability to translate their preferences into political change, but also by
breaching the relationship of trust between governors and governed promised
by a healthy democracy. “The people are the source of the government’s
authority and (under various substantial restrictions) even of its policies,” moral
philosopher Bernard Williams reminds us. “Government is in some sense a
trust; there is a special relationship between government and people, and it is a

10 See TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

80–81 (2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 106 (2018).
11 Corbin, supra note 1 at 357
12 Id. at 354.
13 See JOHN L. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE 84–86 (2011).
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violation of this conception for secrecy or falsehood to come between trustee
and people.”14
In short, we expect our government to refrain from speaking in ways that
frustrate democracy. Whether our expectations are constitutionally enforceable,
however, is a separate question.

NONCONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC HARMS OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS
Of course, courts are neither the only nor necessarily the best recourse when
we’re unhappy, even infuriated, with our government and its expressive choices.
Other government actors can (and sometimes do) address some of the
government’s lies through statute, counter-speech, even impeachment.15 And
nongovernmental actors can (and sometimes do) exercise their power to resist
and rebut the government’s destructive speech. To illustrate, in the summer of
2020 as I write this essay, social media platform Twitter labeled two of President
Trump’s posts regarding mail-in voting as “potentially misleading,” and shortly
thereafter tagged Trump’s tweets on the George Floyd protests in Minneapolis
with a warning that the tweet “violated the Twitter Rules about glorifying
violence.” At the same time, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s refusal to
moderate Trump’s posts met with angry outcries by many of its current and
former employees: some Facebook employees threatened to resign if Mr.
Zuckerberg did not reverse his position, while others participated in a virtual
walkout in protest. Whether any of these efforts will influence the government’s
expressive choices, or the democratic harm they sometimes inflict, remains to
be seen.
14 BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 210

(2002); see also SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND
THE LAW 198 (2015) (“Politically, those in charge of putting our joint moral commitments
into action and enforcing them—namely, state officials—are well placed to serve as points
of triangulation, expositors, and repositories of our best information about the law and its
moral and political underpinnings. We need salient common sources of information to help
us locate the relevant moral and legal facts and to identify the content of the joint perception
of those facts. We also need to know that officials believe these to be the relevant facts, if
those officials are to merit the role of a legitimate political (not merely epistemic) authority.
Thus, state officials, at least in a democracy, must aspire to be relevant epistemic authorities
on the law and on at least that aspect of morality embodied in law. We should be able to rely
on their transmissions about the content of law, legally relevant morality, and legally relevant
facts.”).
15 See NORTON, supra note 7, at 220–31 (detailing an array of nonconstitutional
responses to the government’s destructive speech); Katherine Shaw, Impeachable Speech,
70 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (explaining how the efforts to impeach Presidents
Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton “encompassed, among other things, public
presidential rhetoric—lies and misrepresentations; statements that took aim at Congress or
undermined the rule of law”).
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This might lead one to think that the government’s falsehoods call for
political solutions (like campaigning and voting against governmental liars)
rather than legal solutions that take the form of constitutional litigation. But the
better understanding, in Corbin’s opinion—and mine—is that the Constitution
has something to say about the government’s choices that subvert democracy.
Indeed, political remedies offer limited respite from the democratic harms of the
government’s lies that successfully thwart political accountability, and the
government has additional political incentive to engage in these lies when its
preferred constituencies reward them. Judicial review thus provides a critically
important check on the government’s choices that inflict democratic harm while
evading democratic accountability. Along these lines, many thoughtful
commentators have wrestled with how and when the Constitution constrains the
government’s choices that inflict collective democratic harm in contexts like
campaign finance reform, gerrymandering, and election law more generally.16

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES (AND THEIR LIMITS) TO THE DEMOCRATIC
HARMS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS
Even so, constitutional law is notoriously limited in its ability to address
diffuse or collective harms. The democratic harms of the government’s
falsehoods thus resist redress through traditional constitutional litigation
precisely because those harms are so large and generalized in scope.
Some background may be of help. As a threshold matter, the Supreme
Court’s justiciability doctrine holds that federal courts do not have the
constitutional power to adjudicate a claim unless the plaintiff alleges a “concrete
and particularized,” rather than generalized, injury.17 This doctrine seeks,
among other objectives, to channel collective grievances to the political process
for redress. For this reason, the government’s falsehoods that inflict more
concrete and individualized harms may be more amenable to constraint through
constitutional litigation18 than its falsehoods that inflict democratic, and thus
more generalized, harms.
A related question involves whether and when nongovernmental speakers’
lies threaten harm sufficient to justify the government’s punishment consistent
16 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that

“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry”); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (emphasizing the importance of judicial review to protect those
who are unable to protect themselves from majorities through the political process).
17 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
18 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(recognizing organizational challengers’ standing based on their allegations that the federal
government’s speech designating them as Communist front organizations injured their
reputation, and thus their ability to recruit members and raise funds).
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with the First Amendment. More specifically, the Court has signaled that a
private party’s intentional falsehood must inflict “legally cognizable” harm like
reputational harm (in the context of defamation), financial harm (in the context
of fraud), or physical injury (recall Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s familiar
example of falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater19) before the First
Amendment permits the government to restrain it.20 Although the government
(unlike private parties) has no First Amendment rights of its own, the Court’s
insistence on a showing of harm in this context reflects concerns relevant to the
government’s lies as well—more specifically, its search for limiting principles
to protect valuable speech (governmental or otherwise) from chilling effects and
to restrain the partisan excesses of courts, other government actors, and litigants.
Just as courts sometimes fear the overreach of an Orwellian government’s
Ministry of Truth in regulating our own speech,21 they may also worry that
constitutional constraints on the government’s speech will both offend
separation of powers principles and invite opportunistic and abusive litigation
by governmental critics who themselves have a tenuous relationship with
accuracy and fairness.
For these reasons, as I’ve written elsewhere, some of the government’s most
catastrophic lies are those most “resistant to redress.”22 I find this deeply
frustrating. Professor Corbin does too.
Like Corbin, I have long felt that the threats sometimes posed by the
government’s speech are both real and underappreciated—indeed, the
government’s speech can be more dangerous than our speech precisely because
of its governmental source. And, like Corbin, I find that the Supreme Court’s
current doctrine fails to grapple fully with the ways in which the government’s
speech sometimes affirmatively threatens constitutional commitments. And we
both think that various strands of constitutional theory and precedent offer
opportunities to address this failure.
To this end, elsewhere I’ve proposed that we ask and answer a series of
questions about the consequences of, and the motivations underlying, the
government’s speech when thinking about whether and when that speech
violates the Constitution.23
When we look at the effects of the government’s speech, I propose that we
ask whether the government’s speech has altered its targets’ choices and
opportunities to their disadvantage, and whether a specific constitutional
provision forbids the government from causing such harm. Think, for example,
of the government’s threats that silence dissenters as effectively as jailing them,
19 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection

of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”).
20 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion).
21 See id. at 723.
22 NORTON, supra note 7, at 134.
23 See generally id. The next three paragraphs’ discussion draws extensively from that
work.
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the government’s lies that pressure its targets into relinquishing their
constitutional rights as effectively as denying those rights outright, or the
government’s religious speech that coerces listeners’ participation in prayer or
other religious observance as effectively as fining or taxing those who fail to
partake.
Under certain constitutional understandings, moreover, the government’s
speech may violate specific constitutional provisions when it inflicts expressive,
or dignitary, harm upon its targets: think here of the government’s speech,
including but not limited to its falsehoods, that communicates a message of
disrespect or hostility to its targets based on who they are or what they believe.
We can also look at the government’s motives for speaking and ask why the
government chose to speak in a certain way, and whether a specific
constitutional provision denies the government the power to speak for that
reason. This can be the case, for example, of the government’s speech intended
to interfere with constitutionally protected rights, as well as to advance some
religions at the expense of others or to harm members of unpopular groups.
Focusing on the government’s purposes when speaking also offers a plausible
limiting principle (one that interests Corbin too): although government speakers
(along with the rest of us) need some breathing room to make honest mistakes,
we need not leave them room for intentional or reckless falsehoods.
No doubt there are alternative approaches to the constitutional problems
raised by the government’s speech, and I hope others will continue to explore
those possibilities.24 Professor Corbin’s article does exactly that.
To this end, Corbin’s article thoughtfully explores whether and when we
should understand the Free Speech Clause to prohibit what she calls “the
government’s propaganda”—that is, “the government’s knowing or reckless
propagation of verifiably false or misleading statements of fact on matters of
public concern.”25
Drawing from the Free Speech Clause doctrine that applies to the
government’s regulation of nongovernmental speakers, Corbin seeks to capture
the universe of governmental lies most likely to inflict democratic harms. She
thus proposes that courts apply strict scrutiny to the government’s speech that
intentionally or recklessly asserts a verifiably false or misleading statement of
fact on a matter of public concern. As she observes, the Court’s doctrine already
requires judges to make these assessments “albeit not all at the same time”26
(and albeit not always without difficulty). These assessments thus do “not
24 For instance, in addition to the Free Speech Clause and Due Process Clause

constraints identified supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text, we might also explore
Article II’s requirement that the President “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed”
and Article IV’s guarantee to every state “a Republican form of government” as possible
constraints on governmental falsehoods that inflict democratic harm. To be sure, these
possibilities would rely less on precedent or historical practice than on methodologies
emphasizing constitutional structure, purpose, pragmatism, and ethics.
25 Corbin, supra note 1, at 818.
26 Id. at 829.
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require difficult and novel determinations of what amounts to self-interest, or
evaluation of problematic emotions, or manipulation of cognitive errors” such
that courts “need not engage in line-drawing beyond their institutional
competence.”27 Moreover, as she points out, the government is a hardy and selfinterested speaker, and thus unlikely to be easily silenced; indeed, there’s value
in giving the government additional legal incentives to take care with its
speech.28
CONCLUSION
Along with Professor Corbin, I feel that the government’s falsehoods can—
and sometimes do—inflict serious democratic harm, and that political remedies
for such harm are decidedly limited. Even as she and I suggest different
frameworks for addressing the constitutional challenges posed by the
government’s lies, this shared concern inspires our ongoing efforts to identify
the Constitution’s constraints on the government’s choices to wield its
expressive power in destructive ways.

27 Id.
28 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 600 (4th Cir. 2017)

(“To the extent that our review chills campaign promises to condemn and exclude entire
religious groups, we think that a welcome restraint.”), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct.
353 (2017).

